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The Transparency Rules and Transparency Convention: A good start and model 






In July 2013, after nearly three years of work, the United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) adopted a set of arbitration rules that will help 
open some investor-state arbitrations to public view. The UNCITRAL Rules on 
Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration (Transparency Rules) were 
crafted with input from governments, academics, arbitration practitioners, and non-
governmental organizations, and approved by consensus by the member states. When 
applied, the Transparency Rules will require disclosure of information submitted to, 
and issued by, arbitral tribunals throughout proceedings, mandate open hearings and 
expressly allow for participation by non-parties to a dispute.
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 The Transparency Rules 
also guard against disclosure of confidential information and establish a repository in 




But while the Transparency Rules are an important first step in efforts to shed light on 
the often-opaque investor-state arbitrations, they still leave much work to be done.  
 
The problem is not in their content but in their application. In particular, Article 1(2) 
of the Transparency Rules carves out from their coverage all treaties concluded 
before the Transparency Rules entered into force on April 1, 2014, unless states or 
disputing parties specifically take steps to “opt in” to the Transparency Rules by clear 
agreement. For these thousands of existing treaties, this provision effectively turns the 
Transparency Rules into optional guidelines. 
 
In July 2014, UNCITRAL took a step to help close this large loophole
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 by finalizing 
the Mauritius Convention on Transparency (Transparency Convention).  
 
In brief, the Transparency Convention establishes two main routes for the 
Transparency Rules to apply to existing treaties. First, if both the respondent state and 
the home country of the claimant are parties to the Transparency Convention (and 
have not taken relevant reservations), any arbitration initiated by a claimant—whether 




Second, there is an option for states to make binding unilateral offers to arbitrate 
under the Transparency Rules. Even if the home country is not a party to the 
Transparency Convention, or is a party but has taken a specific reservation for the 
relevant investment treaty, the Transparency Rules will apply if the respondent state 
has given its advance consent under the Transparency Convention and the investor 
agrees to apply the Transparency Rules.  
 
The Transparency Convention will go to the United Nations General Assembly for 
approval in Fall 2014 and enter into force once ratified by three states.  
 
But as efforts to ensure wide adoption of the Transparency Convention proceed, 
efforts should also be made for broader and deeper reforms.  
 
First, both the Transparency Rules and Transparency Convention leave gaps enabling 
states and investors to continue to avoid disclosure. Reform is thus needed in other 





Indeed, ICSID, an early leader on transparency, has recently signaled that it will 
revisit the issue. When it does, it should ensure any reforms reflect commitment to 
transparency in disputes arising under existing as well as future treaties.  
 
Second, and also relevant for ICSID, reforms need to move beyond investment treaty 
disputes and require disclosure of information relating to investor-state disputes 
arising under contracts. Particularly in an era when transparency of investor-state 
contracts is increasingly recognized within the United Nations and the World Bank as 
a fundamental element of good governance, it makes little sense to allow those 
disputes to remain behind closed doors.   
 
Third, states should consider the Transparency Convention as a model for 
implementing broader reforms. Through its use of reciprocal commitments, unilateral 
offers and reservations, it shows how states can achieve changes in the investment-
treaty system in addition to ensuring transparency. A similar convention could, for 
example, create a new standing judicial body or appellate mechanism for investor-
state arbitrations.  
 
Overall, UNCITRAL’s recent steps recognize the importance of transparency in 
promoting good governance and accountability and show how the content and 
structure of the existing investment regime can be reformed. All eyes are now on 
other institutions like ICSID and treaty negotiators to follow suit. 
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 For more information, see Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment, Submissions to UNCITRAL 
Working Group II on Arbitration and Conciliation, http://ccsi.columbia.edu/2013/02/05/submissions-
to-uncitral-working-group-ii-on-arbitration-and-conciliation/. 
2
 See UNCITRAL, Transparency Registry, http://www.uncitral.org/transparency-
registry/registry/index.jspx. 
3
 States and disputing parties can also use other paths to signal their agreement to apply the 
Transparency Rules to disputes arising under treaties carved out by Article 1(2). For more on this, see 
Lise Johnson and Nathalie Bernasconi-Osterwalder, “New UNCITRAL arbitration rules on 
transparency: Application, content and next steps,” August 2013, pp. 23-25, available at 
http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2014/04/UNCITRAL_Rules_on_Transparency_commentary_FINAL.pdf.  
4
 For a comparison of the UNCITRAL and other arbitration rules, see Johnson and Bernasconi-
Osterwalder, supra note 3, pp. 6-7. 
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